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Abstract
Background: There is an ongoing debate in Germany about the assumption that patients with
private health insurance (PHI) benefit from better access to medical care, including shorter waiting
times (Lüngen et al. 2008), compared to patients with statutory health insurance (SHI).
Problem: Existing analyses of the determinants for waiting times in Germany are a) based on
patient self-reports and b) do not cover the inpatient sector. This paper aims to fill both gaps by (i)
generating new primary data and (ii) analyzing waiting times in German hospitals.
Methods: We requested individual appointments from 485 hospitals within an experimental study
design, allowing us to analyze the impact of PHI versus SHI on waiting times (Asplin et al. 2005).
Results: In German acute care hospitals patients with PHI have significantly shorter waiting times
than patients with SHI.
Conclusion: Discrimination in waiting times by insurance status does occur in the German acute
hospital sector. Since there is very little transparency in treatment quality in Germany, we do not
know whether discrimination in waiting times leads to discrimination in the quality of treatment.
This is an important issue for future research.
Introduction and Objectives
In Germany, one of the main issues of the 2007 Health
Reform was access to medical services. The legitimate
political objective of securing access to medical services
[1] is now basically ensured with the legally specified
insurance for all citizens [2]. However, as there are still
compulsorily- and privately-insured persons in Germany
even after this reform, an important remaining question is
whether access also depends on insurance type. In times
of rationed medical supply, hospitals could implement
waiting lists to discriminate between patients by urgency
of treatment needs, but also by profitability. Holders of
private health insurance (PHI) often have better access to
more innovative and costly treatments than holders of
statutory health insurance (SHI) [3]. Thus, discriminating
between PHI and SHI patients is potentially profitable for
providers of medical services. Indeed, empirical results
reveal that private insurees benefit from better access to
medical care including shorter waiting times. Studies
using US data show that Medicaid patients were shown to
have higher waiting times than privately insured patients,
who pay more for equal treatments [4,5]. However empir-
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ical literature on the association between insurance status
and waiting times in Germany is scarce.
Provision of services within the German health care sys-
tem is divided between the ambulatory sector, including
all office-based physicians, and the hospital sector. In the
German ambulatory sector, where remuneration for treat-
ing PHI-patients is on average 20-35% higher than for
treating SHI patients, the difference in waiting times
between patient types amounts to 300% [6]. To-date there
is no corollary study examining access to services in Ger-
man acute care hospitals. Acute care hospitals are the most
important care providers in Germany, and include all
short-term hospitals with the facilities, medical staff and
necessary personnel to diagnose, care and treat a wide
range of acute conditions, including emergencies [7].
Therefore the objective of this paper is to determine
empirically whether discrimination of patients by insur-
ance status occurs within the German acute care hospitals.
We assume that the incentives for active discrimination in
waiting times by insurance status are caused by differences
in the insurance restrictions with which the service provid-
ers are confronted. For this reason, Section 2 will describe
the relevant institutional background for health insurance
in the German hospital sector. Section 3 presents the
study design and describes the data. In Section 4 we
describe the estimation strategy and present the results,
which are then discussed in Section 5.
The Role of Health Insurance in the German 
hospital sector
In 2004, German health authorities introduced a Prospec-
tive Payment System (PPS) for hospitals, creating strong
incentives for economic discipline in the hospital sector.
Under PPS hospitals get a fixed payment for each patient
in a diagnosis-related group (DRG), regardless of the
actual costs incurred for the care of the patient. A large lit-
erature documents hospitals' theoretical and empirical
responses in introducing cost-saving or reimbursement-
increasing measures under PPS. These measures include
decreases in the length of stays [8], selective reductions in
expenditures for high-cost patients [9], 'upcoding' - i.e.
switching patients from appropriate lower-paying to
higher-paying DRG in order to inflate reimbursement
[10] and selection of profitable patients [11]. Due to
health insurance regulation in Germany, patient insur-
ance status is thus a potential indicator of profitability for
hospitals. The main regulations are described below.
In Germany, PHI is only available to some segments of
the population, namely civil-servants (compulsory PHI),
the self-employed, and individuals with an annual
income above 48.150 € (optional PHI). The rest of the
population is covered by compulsory SHI [12]. The cost of
holding a PHI depends on morbidity and age. Therefore,
individuals with a lower morbidity profile tend to self-
select into PHI while those with a higher morbidity profile
choose SHI. Overall, due to compulsory coverage and self-
selection, PHI holders are on average healthier and have
higher incomes than SHI holders [13]. Moreover, the
higher-income private insurees are more sensitive to long
waiting times than SHI holders, as their opportunity cost
of waiting (in terms of foregone income or leisure time) is
higher [14]. This strong preference for low waiting times
puts pressure on hospitals to lower their waiting times, in
order not to lose private insurees to competing hospitals.
Moreover, the treatment of PHI holders can generate addi-
tional remuneration not available in basic SHI [15].1
These are 'hotel-benefits' (private rooms), costlier treat-
ment by the chief physician, and access to innovative and
costly treatment methods. In 2006 this additional remu-
neration amounted to 2.5 billion €, or 4% of total hospi-
tal revenues. For a one-bed room only the extra revenue
amounted to 82.61 Euro per day, or around 2.4% of aver-
age cost per patient in 2006 [16].
In sum, we have four arguments as to why (a) hospitals
privilege the treatment of privately insured patients and
(b) the waiting period is applied as a control instrument -
to the advantage of the privately insured patient: the avail-
ability of compulsory PHI for higher income individuals;
the possibility of self-selection into PHI for higher income
(and lower morbidity) segments of the population; addi-
tional possibilities for income generation through the
treatment of PHI patients; and the higher sensitivity of
PHI patients to long waiting times. Therefore we formu-
late the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: In German acute care hospitals, private
patients will get an appointment for treatment faster than
compulsorily insured patients with the same medical indi-
cation.
Study Design and Data
Study Design
Data on waiting times for appointments at acute care hos-
pitals in Germany was not available prior to this study.
Therefore, it was collected following an experimental
study design, as proposed by Asplin et al. (2005). Trained
graduate students, who posed as patients, called hospitals
administrations using standard interview questions and
data collection forms with the aim of obtaining an
appointment for a physician consultation. During the call
the simulated patients (callers) had to make clear that
they had already been through a thorough medical check
by an ambulatory doctor shortly before the appointment
request, such that their diagnosis was already established.
In Germany patients can only be admitted to a hospitalInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:44 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/44
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either as an emergency case or by a referral of a general
practitioner or a specialist. Usually, a general practitioner
provides his patients with an appointment for a hospital
stay. In order to directly obtain an appointment, our sim-
ulated patients told the hospital personnel that they had
to abstain from a routine referral by their doctors due to a
recent tenancy changeover to a new hometown. An
important aspect of the experimental design of our study
was to keep insurance status exogenous to waiting times.
For this purpose, callers were told not to actively commu-
nicate their insurance type. Callers presented themselves
as basic SHI holders only upon request by the personnel
of the hospital.2 Those hospitals actively requesting insur-
ance type were then called a second time within a few days
of the first call.3 During this second call, the simulated
patients claimed to be privately insured. Hospitals not
asking for the insurance type were not called a second
time. The callers collected information as to whether an
appointment was consented to or refused, what the wait-
ing time in days until the appointment was, and on which
day of the week the call was made. Upon attainment, all
appointments were cancelled in order not to bind hospi-
tal capacity. The calls were randomly distributed over
weekdays (Monday to Friday) in 2007.
Before the interviews, a medical practitioner selected three
clinical conditions for callers to use, based on two criteria.
First, the conditions could not be life-threatening or con-
sidered emergency cases, but should necessitate a medical
treatment within a short period (maximum two weeks) to
minimize avoidable detrimental health effects. Second,
the conditions should be treatable by hospitals within the
sample of hospitals for which data on hospital character-
istics was readily available. The chosen conditions are
Weber B Fracture, cervical conization, and stenosis. Weber
B Fracture is a fracture of the ankle joint treated opera-
tively in surgical departments. Cervical conization is an
operative treatment performed by gynecology depart-
ments when cancer is suspected. Stenosis is a constriction
of the coronary vessels treated by a stent implantation in
cardiology departments. The four-digit codes within the
International Classification of Diagnoses in its 10th-Ger-
man Modification are "S82.6" for Weber B Fracture,
"I25.1" for stenosis and "C53.9" for cervical conisation.
Basic Data and Sample Size
Hospitals in the study were selected on the basis of the
Clinic Guide for Germany (Status 31.12.2003) [17]. Table
1 shows that of a total of 2,122 relevant hospitals, 1,339
have a surgical department, 235 hospitals have a cardiol-
ogy department and 1,065 hospitals have a "gynaecology/
obstetrics" department. The sample size is listed in table 1.
4
Data collection took place from 04.25.2006 to
01.25.2007. In order to arrive at the desired sample size,
more than 485 calls had to be made, as some of the ran-
domly-selected hospitals only had general practitioners'
wards in the required department or did not provide the
desired service. The number of hospitals excluded is dis-
played as "exclusion" in the fifth column of Table 1. This
indicates that, for example, for the surgical area 233 hos-
pitals were called for the required 194 appointments.
The number of hospitals actively investigating the insur-
ance status is displayed in Table 1, column 4. Out of a
total of 485 hospitals, 122 actively investigated the insur-
ance status. Thus 25% of the hospital departments called
find the type of insurance relevant. To form a control
group, these hospitals were called again in the second
round. Thus a total of 607 appointments were made.
Table 2 displays the variables generated.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the data. It dis-
plays the number of observations, the mean, the standard
deviation and the minimum and maximum values of the
data. All analyses were performed using Stata 9.0. In the
upper portion of the table, statistics for the full sample are
shown. The lower portion of the table presents the statis-
tics for the subsample of hospitals actively requesting the
insurance type (and therefore called twice). The upper
part of table 3 shows that hospitals that investigated insur-
ance type have on-average higher waiting times than those
who did not. Further, the data reveal that average waiting
times differ by clinical condition and hospital ownership.
Table 1: Random check scope and executed calls
Plan hospitals with Population Calls with a successful appointment Insurance asked for (called twice) Exclusion
Surgery 1,339 194 19 39
Cardiology 235 107 58 30
Gynaecology 1,065 184 45 118
Total 485 122 187International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:44 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/44
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Table 2: List of Variables
Variables evaluated for the entire sample
Name Description
Waiting period Gross waiting period for an appointment
Waitingperiodqueried Gross waiting period for an appointment at those hospitals querying the insurance status
Waitingperiod_n_queried Gross waiting period for an appointment at those hospitals not querying the insurance status
Waitingperiodankle Gross waiting period for an appointment for the diagnosis Weber B Fracture
Waitingperiodstenosis Gross waiting period for an appointment for the diagnosis Stenosis
Waitingperiodconization Gross waiting period for an appointment for the diagnosis Conisation
Waitingperiodprivhosp Gross waiting period for an appointment at private hospitals
Waitingperiodpubhosp Gross waiting period for an appointment at public hospitals
Waitingperiodcharhosp Gross waiting period for an appointment at charitable hospitals
Privately Insured 1, if patient is privately insured, otherwise 0
Insurance Status Questioned 1, if hospital investigated actively the insurance status, otherwise 0
Weber B Fracture 1, if the diagnosis was "Weber B Fracture", otherwise 0
Stenosis 1, if the diagnosis was "Stenosis", otherwise 0
Cervical Conisation 1, if the diagnosis was "Cervical Conisation", otherwise 0
Privately Owned Hospital 1, if the hospital is privately owned, otherwise 0
Public Hospital 1, if the hospital is publicly owned, otherwise 0
Charitable Hospital 1, if the hospital is charity owned, otherwise 0
Number of beds Number of beds in treating hospital
Variables evaluated for the subgroup of hospitals investigating insurance status
Name Description
Waitingperiodprivpat Gross waiting period of privately insured patients with consideration only to those hospitals querying the insurance 
status
Waitingperiodcompat Gross waiting period of compulsorily insured patients with consideration only to those hospitals querying the 
insurance status
Appointment1weekcompat 1, if patient is compulsorily insured and gets appointment within 1 week, otherwise 0
Appointment1weekprivpat 1, if patient is privately insured and gets appointment within 1 week, otherwise 0
Appointment2weekscompat 1, if patient is compulsorily insured and gets appointment within 2 weeks, otherwise 0
Appointment2weeksprivpat 1, if patient is privately insured and gets appointment within 2 weeks, otherwise 0
WaitingperiodcompatSt Gross waiting period of compulsorily insured patients with the diagnosis "Stenosis", consideration only to those 
hospitals querying the insurance statusInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:44 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/44
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As the lower portion of the table shows, average waiting
times clearly differ by insurance type, with PHI holders
having shorter waiting times than SHI holders. The fol-
lowing statistical analyses will deliver more detailed
insights regarding the impact of insurance status on wait-
ing times.
Estimation Strategy
First we test our hypothesis using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression. The logarithmic gross waiting period5 is
used as the dependent variable since gross waiting time is
skewed left, indicated by maximum values strongly vary-
ing from the mean. This allows for an endogenous varia-
ble with approximate Gaussian distribution which is
necessary for an undistorted estimator in the context of an
OLS regression. The short form of the estimated equation
is:
β0 stands for the estimate of the intercept, Ii is a dummy
for the insurance status of the patient; IAFi is a dummy
indicating whether insurance status was actively investi-
gated, Di is a vector of dummies indicating patient clinical
conditions; Xh is a vector of the other observed hospital
characteristics listed in Table 2 and uih is the error terms.
We use specification tests (Ramsey Reset test for omitted
variables; Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for hetero-
scedasticity) to check for violations of the OLS model
assumptions. We also calculated the proportion of PHI
and SHI patients who received an appointment within
one week and within two weeks as a further key indicator
of possible discrimination against SHI patients. As this
comparison has dichotomous characteristics (appoint-
ment within one week equals 0, otherwise 1), we per-
formed McNemar's Test. Finally, we conduct separate
estimates for the subsamples of the three clinical condi-
tions in order to check the robustness of the results.
Results
Overall Analysis
Table 4 presents the OLS results. Specification tests reveal
that the OLS-model assumptions are not violated: A Reset
test did not reject that the OLS-model has no omitted var-
iable bias (F(3, 596) = 1.80; Prob > F = 0.1464) and a
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity
could not reject homoskedastic errors (chi2(1) = 1.94;
Prob > chi2 = 0.1639). The results show that PHI is related
to shorter waiting times than SHI. Thus, insurance status
is a significant predictor of waiting times. On average PHI-
holders' wait was 1.6 days or 18.9% ([exact computation:
100(e(-0.21)-1)]) shorter for treatment than the subgroup
of SHI-holders who were actively questioned about insur-
ance status. Further, we find that this subgroup of SHI-
holders has to wait 21% (([exact computation: 100(e(0.19)-
1)]) longer for treatment than the group of SHI-holders
who were not questioned about their insurance status
(control group). This hints at overall lower capacity utili-
zation in these hospitals as compared to those which
actively investigated the insurance type of the patients.
As a by-product of these empirical analyses, we also found
significant associations of both the clinical diagnoses and
hospital ownership with waiting time. With regard to
diagnosis group, we find that patients diagnosed with
Weber B Fracture receive an appointment significantly
faster than patients diagnosed with Cervical Conisation
(control group). Concretely patients with Weber B Frac-
ture have on average a 78% ([exact computation:
100(e(1.52)-1)]) shorter waiting time than patients diag-
nosed with cancer. The group with Cervical Conisation,
however, received an appointment significantly faster
(24.6%; [exact computation: 100(e(0.22)-1)]) than patients
diagnosed with Stenosis.
Regarding hospital ownership, we find that patients of
public and privately owned hospitals receive appoint-
ments significantly faster than patients of charitable hos-
pitals. Patients of public hospitals receive an appointment
Log Waitingperiod I IAF D X u ih i i i h ih () =+ + + + + bbw g d 0
(1)
WaitingtimeprivpatSt Gross waiting period of privately insured patients with the diagnosis "Stenosis", consideration only to those hospitals 
querying the insurance status
WaitingperiodcompatAnk Gross waiting period of compulsorily insured patients with the diagnosis "Weber B Fracture", consideration only to 
those hospitals querying the insurance status
WaitingperiodprivpatAnk Gross waiting period of privately insured patients with the diagnosis "Weber B Fracture", consideration only to 
those hospitals querying the insurance status
WaitingperiodprivpatCon Gross waiting period of privately insured patients with the diagnosis "Cervical Conisation", consideration only to 
those hospitals querying the insurance status
WaitingperiodcompatCon Gross waiting period of compulsorily insured patients with the diagnosis "Conisation", consideration only to those 
hospitals querying the insurance status
Table 2: List of Variables (Continued)International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:44 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/44
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12.9% [exact computation: 100(e(-0.138)-1)] faster than
patients of charitable hospitals. Appointments at private
hospitals are 16.4% [exact computation: 100(e(-0.179)-1)]
faster than at charitable hospitals. The probit estimate
(left column) also shows a positive relationship between
waiting time for treatment and diagnosis-specific ques-
tioning behavior. In addition to being the group with the
shortest waiting time for treatment, patients with Weber B
Fracture also show the lowest probability of being asked
to state their insurance status. Further, the probit estimate
shows that privately-owned hospitals ask about insurance
status significantly less often than public or charitable
hospitals.
There are also significant differences in the proportions of
those patients who receive an appointment within one
week: while 41% of privately-insured patients receive an
appointment within one week, this is the case for only
28% of compulsorily insured patients. This result does
not change significantly if the time period to the appoint-
ment is extended. Only 73% of the compulsorily-insured
patients received an appointment within two weeks of the
call, while the proportion for privately-insured patients is
81%. Both of these differences - for the period of one week
as well as for two weeks - are statistically significant, as
shown by the results in Table 5.
As a result we may thus state:
The zero hypothesis cannot be disproven based on the data
we have collected. We have to assume that (a) a part of the
hospitals in Germany actively apply waiting periods as an
instrument to control their patient flow and that (b) private
patients will get faster access to in-patient medical services
than compulsory insured patients.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Waiting period 607 8.3081 8.2857 1 56
Waitingperiodqueried 244 9.7541 7.6090 1 48
Waitingperiod_n_queried 363 6.4986 8.2238 1 56
Waitingperiodankle 213 2.5235 4.4204 1 54
Waitingperiodstenosis 165 13.3454 10.8844 1 56
Waitingperiodconization 229 8.7043 4.8478 1 36
Waitingperiodprivhosp 81 6.1358 8.3990 1 54
Waitingperiodpubhosp 294 7.8809 8.6623 1 56
Waitingperiodcharhosp 232 8.2974 7.2332 1 45
Subsample of hospitals called twice Observations Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Waitingperiodprivpat 122 8.9667 7.0996 1 45
Waitingperiodcompat 122 10.5533 7.9788 1 48
Waitingperiodankle 38 3.3947 4.0706 1 23
Waitingperiodstenosis 116 12.8534 9.0518 1 48
Waitingperiodconization 90 8.4254 3.7148 1 21
Waitingperiodprivhosp 16 9.4375 7.4204 1 29
Waitingperiodpubhosp 130 9.0930 7.6663 1 48
Waitingperiodcharhosp 98 10.6667 7.5457 1 45International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:44 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/44
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Detailed Analysis
Table 6 documents the results of the detailed analysis for
each of the three clinical conditions. Because of the con-
siderably lower number of observations, a number of esti-
mation coefficients are no longer significant. However, it
can be said that insurance status within each observed
diagnosis groups shows the expected effect. In addition,
the other estimation coefficients confirm our fundamen-
tal analysis. Only the estimator of privately funded hospi-
tals for stenosis is not in accordance with the core analysis.
Furthermore, a significant negative correlation with wait-
ing time can be shown for the Weber B Fracture and sten-
osis diagnoses for the privately owned hospitals as
compared to the control group, hospitals owned by char-
itable organizations, in spite of the relatively small sample
size.
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to assess the impact of pri-
vate and statutory health insurance on waiting times in
Table 4: Determinants of Waiting Time and Questioning
Variable Gross waiting time (logarithm) Questioned
OLS (for all diagnosis) Probit (for all diagnosis)
Privately Insured -0.21 (0.089)**
Insurance Status Questioned 0.191 (0.078)**
Weber B Fracture -1.52 (0.678)*** -0.229 (0.045)***
Stenosis 0.221 (0.075)*** 0.312 (0.051)***
Privately Owned Hospital -0.179 (0.091)** -0.200 (0.060)**
Public Hospital -0.138 (0.063)** 0.016 (0.466)




Prob > F/Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Adj. R2 or Pseudo1 R2** 0.5762 0.1490
1 Pseudo R2 cannot be compared to adj. R2 because of the different methods of calculation used. Standard errors are shown in brackets. Level of 
significance: ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05.
Table 5: Proportion of patients with an appointment for surgery after 1 or 2 weeks respectively
Variable Observations Mean McNemar's chi2 P-value
Appointment1weekcompat 122 0.28 6.40 0.0114**
Appointment1weekprivpat 122 0.41
Appointment2weekscompat 122 0.73 3.13 0.071*
Appointment2weeksprivpat 122 0.81
Standard error in brackets, significance level: ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.10.International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:44 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/44
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German acute care hospitals. For this purpose, we col-
lected individual appointments from hospitals within an
experimental study design [4]. We find that 25% of Ger-
man hospitals actively query insurance status. In these
hospitals the PHI-holders wait almost 1.6 days or 18.9%
less for an appointment for treatment than SHI-holders.
Only 28% of SHI-holders get an appointment within one
week, compared to 41% of private insurees. Even if the
observation period is extended to two weeks, PHI patients
are significantly more likely than SHI patients to receive
an appointment. As such, we have to assume that some
hospitals in Germany actively use waiting times as an
instrument to control their patient flow and that PHI-
holders therefore have faster access to inpatient medical
services than SHI-holders. The preferential treatment of
PHI-holders may be explainable by profit and costs con-
siderations. In Germany hospitals treating PHI-holders
profit from remuneration generated by additional serv-
ices, which are often unavailable to SHI-holders. Further,
due to health insurance regulation PHI-holders are on
average a relative healthy high income group, which is at
lower risk of generating unremunerated costs for the hos-
pital. Furthermore, PHI-holders are more sensitive to long
waiting times than SHI-holders. In sum, privileging PHI-
holders with shorter waiting times potentially ensures
hospitals a greater number of more profitable patients.
As a by-product of our empirical analyses we find two
additional interesting relationships. First, waiting times
differ for the different clinical diagnoses. We find that
patients diagnosed with Weber B Fracture receive an
appointment significantly faster than patients diagnosed
with cervical consisation or stenosis. Shorter waiting times
in the case of Weber B Fractures are most likely related to
the occurrence of acute pain for these patients. Another
explanation of shorter waiting times in the case of Weber
B Fracture may be that the DRG-remuneration plays an
important role in hospitals' determination of waiting
time. The DRG-benchmark index for the treatment of an
Weber B fracture - the diagnosis with the lowest waiting
time - is 2.15, followed by stenosis (benchmark index
0.96) and conisation (benchmark index 0.488), implying
the highest revenues for treating Weber B fractures [18].
However, our data do not allow us to assess the impact of
the analysed clinical diagnoses in terms of "good DRG" or
"bad DRG". In order to give a more detailed judgment of
the impact of financial incentives on waiting times, this
topic should be considered in future empirical work. Sec-
ond, we find that privately owned hospitals do have sig-
nificantly shorter waiting times than charitable hospitals.
As there is an ongoing process of privatization and reor-
ganization of the German hospital market, a closer look at
the impact of ownership on waiting times may also be a
fruitful research topic.6
Table 6: Diagnoses
Variable Gross Waiting Time (logarithm)
Tobit1 (Weber B Fracture) OLS (Stenosis) OLS (Conisation)
Privately Insured -0.362 (0.191)** -0.152 (0.148) -0.084 (0.107)
Insurance Status Questioned 0.535 (0.138)*** 0.148 (0.156) 0.008 (0.088)
Privately Owned Hospital -0.231 (0.127)* 0.174 (0.236) -0.227 (0.116)*
Public Hospital -0.223 (0.098)** -0.093 (0.141) -0.116 (0.076)
Number of Beds 0.075 (0.129) 0.519 (0.205)** 0.239 (0.119)**
Intercept -0.093 (0.087) 1.981(0.175)*** 1.995(0.076)***
Observations 68 uncensored/144 censored 165 230
F-Value/LR Chi2 20.67 1.33 3.06
Prob > F/Prob > Chi2 0.0021 0.2489 0.0068
Adj. R2 or Pseudo R2 (Mc Fadden) 0.0473 0.0120 0.0512
Standard error in Brackets. Level of Significance: ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.10.International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:44 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/44
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Our study is limited in several respects. The economic
context raises the question of why only 25 percent of the
called hospitals actively investigated the insurance status -
and 75 percent did not. One possible answer may be that
the capacities in these hospitals are not utilised to the
extent that would make a selection expedient, so that
higher utilisation may initially take priority. An underuti-
lised capacity may also explain why the average waiting
time in the non-investigating hospitals is shorter than in
the investigating hospitals (cf. table 3). Capacity may be a
more severe restriction for the latter, and would motivate
a more intense selection of patients. However, the data we
collected did not enable the exploration of these possible
relationships. Further, we do not focus on the SHI-group
with voluntary supplementary private insurance covering
additional hospital services (cf. footnote 1). As this exclu-
sion could bias our results, this group should be examined
by further research.
The medical context of this study raises concerns regard-
ing whether and how differences in waiting times might
affect health status. Considering the magnitude of the
effects, it is not possible to say whether an additional 2
days of waiting time for SHI patients may damage their
health. However, as most waiting times are within a med-
ically acceptable timeframe, most likely it should not.
Another limitation concerns the generalisability of our
results: Our callers were - by definition - posing as new
patients at every clinic they contacted. As typically patients
obtain appointments by referral through the ambulatory
health sector in Germany, we cannot rule out that the dif-
ference in waiting times between PHI and SHI patients is
influenced systematically by our study design. However
this does not negate the importance of our findings. First,
national [6] and international studies [4] confirm the
influence of financial incentives on waiting times. Second,
even though patients typically obtain appointments by
referral through the ambulatory sector, it is not unusual
for patients to try to get an appointment over the tele-
phone without seeking in-person care first. Further regard-
ing generalisability, we acknowlege that our study
included only three diagnoses. Therefore we do not know
if differences in waiting times between SHI and PHI
would significantly change given other diagnoses. Fur-
thermore, for these diagnoses it is quite atypical for the
patient themselves to make a clinical appointment. Addi-
tional insights could be gained by examining strictly elec-
tive surgical procedures, such as total hip replacement or
cholecystectomy.
While we clearly show that discrimination in waiting
times by insurance status does occur in the German acute
hospital sector, we do not know whether discrimination
in waiting times carries on to discrimination in the treat-
ment quality. This is an important issue, especially as
there is very little transparency in quality of treatment in
Germany. In the end, patients cannot judge which hospi-
tals provide the best treatment. As long as quality remains
nontransparent, it will be easier for hospitals to discrimi-
nate amongst patients by insurance status. This is an
important issue for future research.
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Appendix
1 SHI holders can voluntarily purchase supplementary pri-
vate insurance to cover additional hospital services. Cur-
rently 5.1 Million (7.1%) of SHI-Insurees chose this
option [15].
2 We do not focus on the SHI-group with voluntary sup-
plementary private insurance covering additional hospital
services (cf. footnote 1) and discuss this non-considera-
tion in the limitations section.
3 The average lag between first and second call was 7 days.
The lag was meant to be kept short in order to minimize
the risk that a sudden change in a hospital's capacity utili-
zation could significantly impact waiting times. Where
possible, in order to prevent the interviewer from being re-
identified by the personnel of the hospital, second calls
were done by different callers. Furthermore, caller identi-
fication for all outgoing calls was blocked.
4  For calculation purposes, we applied the minimum
required random check scopes with a safety probability of
95%, a maximum tolerated random check error of 7%,
and a proportion of hospitals for reasons of missing expe-
rience data conservatively to 50%.
5 The gross waiting time determined in the study contains
the number of days from the day of the call to the appoint-
ment, including all public holidays and weekends (Satur-
day/Sunday).
6 Furthermore we neglected the impact of market structure
on waiting times. Since the market structure has an impact
on treatment alternatives on site, this topic should be con-
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